# The Effect of Government Intervention on the Operational Decisions of NGOs: Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Three Electoral Autocracies

## Supplementary Appendices

### Appendices

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#### A Survey Question Wording

To measure whether NGOs experience tensions with government, we ask each NGO three questions about the extent to which they experience tensions. Questions about confrontation with government include:

- Does your organization ever do work that could be considered politically sensitive by the government? [Yes/No]
- Does your organization experience tensions with the government because of the type of work they do? [Yes/No]
- Does your organization experience tensions with the government because of the communities they serve? [Yes/No]

To measure the sector in which NGOs work, we asked organizations to select the category of activities that they focused on. If they chose more than one, we asked them to choose their primary focus. For ease of analysis, we group NGOs into three categories: 'Service Delivery NGOs', 'Advocacy NGOs', with all other categories combined into an 'Other NGOs' category. Possible response options for self-reported question about NGO sector include:

- Advocacy NGO: Promoting awareness or conducting advocacy for political issues
- Service Delivery NGO: Delivering services directly to villages, households, or individuals
- Intermediary Support Organization or CSO Resource Center: Building the capacity and skills of other NGOs and CSOs
- NGO Network, Forum, or Umbrella Organization: Supporting and building NGO networks
- Professional Association: Advocating for organizations and individuals engaged in a particular profession
- Social Enterprise: A for-profit commercial entity aimed at promoting social wellbeing
- Think Tank or Policy Research Organization: Producing original research to inform public policy

#### B Hypotheses

Below, we list the main hypotheses specified in our pre-analysis plan:

- We expect that NGOs will prefer to implement activities in communities where LAs employ more accommodative and less coercive operational interventions.
- We expect that they will prefer to implement activities in communities that have experienced less cooptation of NGOs.
- When LAs are accommodative, we expect NGOs to increase their use of external engagement. We expect NGOs to decrease their use of these strategies when coercion is more common
- When local governments are accommodative, we expect NGOs to increase their engagement with government actors.

- We expect that confrontational NGOs will be more likely to be targeted by government coercion, and as a result, they will be more likely than non-confrontational NGOs to adjust their behavior to avoid communities where it is more prevalent.
- We expect that organizations engaged in more innocuous activities "non-confrontational NGOs" – will be less likely than their confrontational counterparts to change their behavior in the face of increased coercion.
- We expect confrontational NGOs to report smaller effects for the positive attribute levels of the operational and rhetorical intervention than non-confrontational NGOs.

#### C Diagnostics

Figure 1 presents the frequency with which each attribute value was shown to respondents. This uniform distribution shows that the randomization was successful. We also conducted Left/Right profile selection bias tests for each outcome. Two of our seven outcomes, Partner with CBOs and Partner with other NGOs, return a significant F-Test, indicating that the first (left) profile is selected more often than the second (Right) profile. However, looking at the individual coefficients for each attribute level, the only attribute level with a statistically significant coefficient for first profile bias was Project Value: \$40,000. This strengthens our confidence that respondents were attentive to the conjoint tasks.




Figure 1: Display frequency for each attribute value for the full sample of NGOs.

# D Descriptive Associations between NGO Behaviors and Tensions with Government

Table 1: Cross-sectional linear relationships between NGO behaviors and tensions with government

	Involve Public	Number of NGO Partners	Mobilize Public Action	Partner with Other CBOs	Partner with Local Govt	Partner with Leaders
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Politically Sensitive Work	0.131	8.059***	0.301***	0.071	0.061	0.035
	(0.083)	(2.227)	(0.085)	(0.079)	(0.080)	(0.071)
Tension Because of Work	-0.149	2.582	-0.015	0.071	0.013	-0.071
	(0.091)	(2.446)	(0.094)	(0.087)	(0.088)	(0.078)
Tension Because of Communities	-0.065	-3.690*	0.093	-0.121	-0.143*	-0.024
_ ,	(0.083)	(2.233)	(0.086)	(0.079)	(0.080)	(0.071)
Observations	423	423	423	423	423	423

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

All models include country fixed effects.

Outcomes 1, 3 - 6 are ordinal verbals with three levels, treated as numeric. Outcome 2 is count of NGO partners.

#### E Additional Descriptive Information

Figure 2 reports the share of total revenues that come from international sources for each NGO according to the extent to which they report experiencing tensions with government. In all three countries, most NGOs in our sample receive most of their funding from international sources such as international NGOs (INGOs) and foreign government aid, although this share is noticeably lower in Serbia. NGOs that report higher levels of tension with government tend to receive a larger share of their revenues from these foreign sources (this relationship is noticeably weaker in Serbia). Whether this correlation is causal or the result of selection is unclear, but it suggests that most NGOs experiencing tensions with government are receiving the bulk of their financial support from foreign aid and philanthropy.

#### Distribution of Percent of Revenue from International NGOs and Foreign Governments By Levels of Confrontational Activity




Figure 2: This plot shows the distribution of NGOs according to the number of questions about confrontation with government that they responded 'Yes' to and the share of their total revenues that come from international sources.

#### F Main Effects

Following Leeper et al. (2020), we present marginal means (MMs) and AMCEs for each outcome. MMs give the mean outcome across all appearances of a particular attribute value, averaging across all other features. The point of comparison for each estimate is 0.5, reflecting the 50% baseline probability of selection in a forced choice context. MMs above 0.5 indicate attribute values that increase the chance of selection and MMs below 0.5 indicate values that decrease the chance of selection. AMCEs give the estimated marginal effect of each attribute value on grant selection relative to a baseline category. AMCEs significantly greater than zero indicate attribute values that have a positive causal effect on grant selection, while AMCEs less than zero indicate attribute values that have a negative effect on grant selection. We also present all results after applying two different corrections for multiple hypothesis testing. This allows readers to compare the Ash corrects (used in the main test) with more severe Bonferroni corrections.

#### Community NGO Is More Likely to Work In




Figure 3: Marginal means (left panel) and AMCE estimates (right panel) for the full sample of respondents. For marginal means, points to the left of the grey line indicate that an attribute made respondents less likely to select a community (on average). For AMCEs, points to the left of the grey line indicate a negative causal effect of the attribute on community selection relative to the baseline category (on average).

#### (Community Development) -More -Similar -Less (Community Accessibility) Very Difficult-Somewhat Difficult-Not Difficult-(Operational Intervention) Arrest NGO staff -Disrupt NGO events Administrative support Financial/in-kind support (Cooptation) Treat cooperators better reat cooperators better— Treat all NGOs equally— (Government Rhetoric)— NGOs are corrupt— NGOs are foreign agents— NGOs are partners— (Public Rumors)— NGOs are corrupt NGOs are foreign agents No rumors -(Project Value) -\$60,000 -\$40,000 **-**\$20,000 **-**

Community NGO is More Likely to Work In

Figure 4: AMCE estimates comparing multiple hypothesis testing correction methods.

o.o Estimated AMCE (Corrected)

0.1

0.2

-0.1

-0.2

#### Involve public in project activities




Figure 5: Marginal means (left panel) and AMCE estimates (right panel) for the full sample of respondents. For marginal means, points to the left of the grey line indicate that an attribute made respondents less likely to select a grant (on average). For AMCEs, points to the left of the grey line indicate a negative causal effect of the attribute on grant selection relative to the baseline category (on average).

#### Involve Public in Project Activities




Figure 6: AMCE estimates comparing multiple hypothesis testing correction methods.

#### Organise public action (petitions, demonstrations, contacting government officials)




Figure 7: Marginal means (left panel) and AMCE estimates (right panel) for the full sample of respondents. For marginal means, points to the left of the grey line indicate that an attribute made respondents less likely to select a grant (on average). For AMCEs, points to the left of the grey line indicate a negative causal effect of the attribute on grant selection relative to the baseline category (on average).




Figure 8: AMCE estimates comparing multiple hypothesis testing correction methods.

#### Partner with community organizations on project activities




Figure 9: Marginal means (left panel) and AMCE estimates (right panel) for the full sample of respondents. For marginal means, points to the left of the grey line indicate that an attribute made respondents less likely to select a grant (on average). For AMCEs, points to the left of the grey line indicate a negative causal effect of the attribute on grant selection relative to the baseline category (on average).

#### Partner with Community Other CBOs (Community Development) -More · Similar Less (Community Accessibility) Very Difficult-Somewhat Difficult-Not Difficult-(Operational Intervention) Arrest NGO staff Disrupt NGO events Administrative support Financial/in-kind support (Cooptation) Treat cooperators better reat cooperators better— Treat all NGOs equally— (Government Rhetoric)— NGOs are corrupt— NGOs are foreign agents— NGOs are partners— (Public Rumors)— NGOs are corrupt NGOs are foreign agents No rumors -(Project Value) -\$60,000 -\$40,000 **-**\$20,000 **-**-0.1 -0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 Estimated AMCE (Corrected)

Figure 10: AMCE estimates comparing multiple hypothesis testing correction methods.

#### Partner with other NGOs on project activities




Figure 11: Marginal means (left panel) and AMCE estimates (right panel) for the full sample of respondents. For marginal means, points to the left of the grey line indicate that an attribute made respondents less likely to select a grant (on average). For AMCEs, points to the left of the grey line indicate a negative causal effect of the attribute on grant selection relative to the baseline category (on average).

#### Partner with Other NGOs (Community Development) -More · Similar Less (Community Accessibility) Very Difficult-Somewhat Difficult-Not Difficult-(Operational Intervention) Arrest NGO staff Disrupt NGO events Administrative support Financial/in-kind support (Cooptation) Treat cooperators better reat cooperators better— Treat all NGOs equally— (Government Rhetoric)— NGOs are corrupt— NGOs are foreign agents— NGOs are partners— (Public Rumors)— NGOs are corrupt NGOs are foreign agents No rumors · (Project Value) -\$60,000 -\$40,000 **-**\$20,000 **-**-0.1 -0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 Estimated AMCE (Corrected)

Figure 12: AMCE estimates comparing multiple hypothesis testing correction methods.

#### Partner with religious or traditional leaders on project activities




Figure 13: Marginal means (left panel) and AMCE estimates (right panel) for the full sample of respondents. For marginal means, points to the left of the grey line indicate that an attribute made respondents less likely to select a grant (on average). For AMCEs, points to the left of the grey line indicate a negative causal effect of the attribute on grant selection relative to the baseline category (on average).

#### Partner with Religious or Traditional Leaders (Community Development) -More · Similar Less -(Community Accessibility) -Very Difficult -Somewhat Difficult -Not Difficult -(Operational Intervention) Arrest NGO staff Disrupt NGO events Administrative support Financial/in-kind support (Cooptation) (Cooptation) Treat cooperators better Treat all NGOs equally (Government Rhetoric) NGOs are corrupt NGOs are foreign agents NGOs are partners (Public Rumors) NGOs are corrupt -NGOs are corrupt NGOs are foreign agents No rumors -(Project Value) -\$60,000 -\$40,000 **-**\$20,000 **-**-0.1 -0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 Estimated AMCE (Corrected)

Figure 14: AMCE estimates comparing multiple hypothesis testing correction methods.

#### Partner with local government on project activities




Figure 15: Marginal means (left panel) and AMCE estimates (right panel) for the full sample of respondents. For marginal means, points to the left of the grey line indicate that an attribute made respondents less likely to select a grant (on average). For AMCEs, points to the left of the grey line indicate a negative causal effect of the attribute on grant selection relative to the baseline category (on average).

#### Partner with Local Government on Project Activities




Figure 16: AMCE estimates comparing multiple hypothesis testing correction methods.

#### G **Heterogeneous Treatment Effects**

#### Partner with Local Govt Work in Community Country Uganda - Serbia Country Uganda - Serbia (Community Development) More Similar (Community Accessibility) Very Difficult Somewhat Difficult Not Difficult (Operational Intervention) Arrest NGO staff Disrupt NGO events Administrative support Financial/in-kind support (Cooptation) Treat cooperators better Treat all NGOs equally (Government Rhetoric) NGOs are corrupt NGOs are foreign agents NGOs are partners (Public Rumors) NGOs are corrupt NGOs are foreign agents No rumors (Project Value) \$60,000 \$40,000 \$20,000 -0.04 -0.04 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00

Outcome-attribute-comparison with at least one level surviving ASH MHTC

Figure 17: Difference in MM estimates with adaptive shrinking corrections. Points to the left of the grey line indicate a negative difference between the of mean percentage of selection of a community for an outcome (first line in the facet label) for an attribute-level for two subgroups (third line of the facet label) for a certain variable over which we are checking for heterogeneity (second line of the facet label). For the Ash, we pooled all attribute-level differences for variables that survived the BH F-test corrections (This leaves us with 25 outcome-heterogeneous variable-comparison sets). We then drop outcome-heterogeneous variablecomparison sets for which no attribute-level differences were significant after Ash corrections. Like for the main results, we also do not show attributes-levels for attributes where no attribute-level saw a significant difference.

Estimated Difference in Marginal Means (Corrected)

#### Η Cambodia Panel Data

Here, we present the question wording for the survey questions used in Section 8 of the main text. Time Allocation:

Imagine a typical month of operations for your organization. What share of your staff and man-

agement time is spent on the following activities? The total should equal 100%.

- Advocacy or raising awareness: Mobilizing affected groups around specific issues, building political awareness, or trying to influence policy
- Community outreach and communication: Communicating with current or potential beneficiaries or promoting your organization's work to the public

#### Partnerships with NGOs:

• How many NGOs did your organization partner with in the last 12 months? This includes local and international NGOs, CBOs, religious organizations, and foundations.