

# The Effect of Government Repression on Civil Society: Evidence from Cambodia

Online Appendix

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## **A Sector Definitions**

- Advocacy NGO: Promoting awareness or conducting advocacy for political issues
- Service Delivery NGO: Delivering services directly to villages, households, or individuals
- NGO Network, Forum, or Umbrella Organization: Supporting and building NGO networks
- Social Enterprise: A for-profit commercial entity aimed at promoting social wellbeing
- Intermediary Support Organization or CSO Resource Center: Building the capacity and skills of other NGOs and CSOs.
- Micro-Finance Institution: Providing loans or savings schemes for individuals or small and medium enterprises
- Professional Association: Advocating for organizations and individuals engaged in a particular profession
- Think Tank or Policy Research Organization: Producing original research to inform public policy

## B Grant Application Behavior

This section provides descriptive information on the average number of grants that NGOs in our sample applied for during 2019 and the average combined value of those grants, as well as the average number of grants that NGOs in our sample were awarded and the average combined value of those grants.

Table 2: This table shows the average number and average combined value of grants that NGOs applied for and were awarded in 2019.

CSO Sector	Number of Grants			Value of Grants		
	Applied	Awarded	Share	Applied	Awarded	Share
Services	13.75	7.84	57%	\$888,971	\$477,833	54%
Advocacy	6.47	2.33	36%	\$373,624	\$175,049	47%
Other	5.97	3.69	62%	\$681,128	\$255,864	38%

## C Pre-Registered Hypotheses

We expect that NGOs will maximize revenue by pursuing the largest grants available. More revenue increases the chances that organizations will survive and allow organizations to do more work in pursuit of their mission. We expect:

**H 1** *As the value of a grant increases, the probability of grant selection by NGOs will increase*

We also expect that NGOs are mission-driven. All else equal, organizations will prefer grants that allow them to focus more time on their core organizational competencies. Grants that match organizational competencies will permit more efficient work while also satisfying intrinsic motivations to fulfill the organization’s mission. We expect:

**H 2** *As the share of time spent on activities outside of an organization’s core competencies increases, the probability of grant selection by NGOs will decrease*

Repressive governments use a variety of tactics to hinder the work of NGOs. For this reason, we expect:

**H 3** *As the severity of monitoring and interference by government increases in districts where grant work will take place, the probability of grant selection by NGOs will decrease*

Relatedly, while we expect strategic organizations to pursue larger grants, we also expect that the source of funding will affect strategic incentives. All else equal, we expect organizations to prefer to receive funding from sources that have a less contentious relationship with their domestic government. We expect:

**H 4** *The probability of grant selection by NGOs will be lower for grants funded by donors with a contentious relationship with the national government*

We expect that both advocacy and service delivery NGOs will prefer to work in areas with less aggressive monitoring and interference by district governments, but this preference will be concentrated among advocacy NGOs that are more likely to be targeted. This generates the following hypothesis:

**H 5** *As the severity of monitoring and interference by government increases in districts where grant work will take place, the probability of grant selection will decrease more sharply for advocacy relative to service delivery NGOs*


How NGOs fare in an increasingly restrictive environment will also depend on their capacity. We argue that higher-capacity organizations will be less vulnerable to government restrictions. This generates the following hypotheses:

**H 6** *As the severity of monitoring and interference by government increases in districts where grant work will take place, the probability of grant selection by will decrease more sharply for low-capacity relative to high-capacity NGOs*


We also argue that stronger networks can make organizations less vulnerable to government restrictions. We argue that denser networks are likely to increase the ability of NGOs to share critical information, learn about effective strategies, and access material and legal resources. We expect:

**H 7** *As the severity of monitoring and interference by government increases in districts where grant work will take place, the probability of grant selection by will decrease more sharply for NGOs with smaller networks relative to NGOs with larger networks*

## **D Diagnostics**



(a) Full Sample



(b) Advocacy NGOs

(c) Service Delivery NGOs

Figure 7: Display frequency for each grant attribute value for the full sample of NGOs and for Advocacy and Service Delivery NGOs.




Figure 8: Diagnostic test for respondent preference for the order in which grant profiles are displayed on the page (Grant A is displayed on top while Grant B is displayed immediately below). Nested model comparison F-test provides a test of whether any of the interactions between the attribute values and profile order differ from zero.




Figure 9: Diagnostic test for respondent preference for the order in which grant profiles choices are displayed in the survey (Choice 1 is the first grant profile pair displayed while Choice 5 is the final grant profile pair displayed). Nested model comparison F-test provides a test of whether any of the interactions between the attribute values and choice order differ from zero.

## E Effect Among Pure and Mixed Service NGOs

This section compares the effect of each conjoint attribute among service NGOs that report advocacy as a secondary area of activity (Mixed NGOs) and service NGOs that do not report advocacy as a secondary area of activity (Pure Service NGOs).




Figure 10: Marginal means (top panel) and AMCE estimates (bottom panel) for the effect of government harassment on service NGOs across NGOs that report advocacy as a secondary area of activity (first panel), that don't report advocacy as a secondary area of activity (second panel), and the difference between them (third panel). For marginal means, points to the left of the grey line indicate that an attribute made respondents less likely to select a grant (on average). For AMCEs, points to the left of the grey line indicate a negative causal effect of the attribute on grant selection relative to the baseline category (on average).

## F Effects by Age Among Advocacy NGOs

This section compares the effect of each conjoint attribute among NGOs founded more than 10 years ago (first panel) and NGOs founded less than ten years ago.




Figure 11: Marginal means (top panel) and AMCE estimates (bottom panel) for the effect of government harassment on advocacy NGOs across NGOs founded more than 10 years ago (first panel), less than ten years ago (second panel), and the difference between them (third panel). For marginal means, points to the left of the grey line indicate that an attribute made respondents less likely to select a grant (on average). For AMCEs, points to the left of the grey line indicate a negative causal effect of the attribute on grant selection relative to the baseline category (on average).



## G Pre-registered Subgroup Effects

### High vs Low Capacity

We measure organizational capacity using two index variables. We code respondents who's NGOs have scores in the top 75% as high capacity. The first index combines measures of NGO size, including the number of employees, the number of office and programming locations, and the size of the budget.




Figure 12: [professionalism] Marginal means (top panel) and AMCE estimates (bottom panel) for the effect of government harassment across highly professional NGOs (first panel), less professional NGOs (second panel), and the difference between them (third panel). For marginal means, points to the left of the grey line indicate that an attribute made respondents less likely to select a grant (on average). For AMCEs, points to the left of the grey line indicate a negative causal effect of the attribute on grant selection relative to the baseline category (on average). Our theory expects that the difference between more and less professional NGOs will be positive, indicating that points in the third panel should be to the right of the grey line.

The second index combines measures of the professionalism of NGOs, including whether they have the capacity to serve as primary grant recipients for large donors and give sub-awards to lower capacity organizations, whether they undergo an annual external audit, the level of education obtained by their executive director, and whether they were able to attach an official copy of the last year’s budget report.




Figure 13: [Size] Marginal means (top panel) and AMCE estimates (bottom panel) for the effect of government harassment across large NGOs (first panel), small NGOs (second panel), and the difference between them (third panel). For marginal means, points to the left of the grey line indicate that an attribute made respondents less likely to select a grant (on average). For AMCEs, points to the left of the grey line indicate a negative causal effect of the attribute on grant selection relative to the baseline category (on average). Our theory expects that the difference between larger and smaller NGOs will be positive, indicating that points in the third panel should be to the right of the grey line.

## More vs Less Extensive Networks

We measure organizational networks using a question that asks respondents to list other NGOs they have partnered with over the past year. We count the number of partnerships for each NGO, and code respondents who's NGOs have scores in the top 75% as highly networked.




Figure 14: Marginal means (top panel) and AMCE estimates (bottom panel) for the effect of government harassment across more networked NGOs (first panel), less networked NGOs (second panel), and the difference between them (third panel). For marginal means, points to the left of the grey line indicate that an attribute made respondents less likely to select a grant (on average). For AMCEs, points to the left of the grey line indicate a negative causal effect of the attribute on grant selection relative to the baseline category (on average). Our theory expects that the difference between more and less networked NGOs will be positive, indicating that points in the third panel should be to the right of the grey line.

## Subgroup Balance




Figure 15: Subgroup balance regressing subgroup indicator on attribute values

## H Ordinal Ratings Outcome

In addition to asking respondents to choose which grant their organization would be most likely to apply for, we also ask respondents to rate how likely their organization would be to apply for each grant. The question was worded as follows:

If you could apply for both grants, how likely is it that your organization would

apply for each grant? [Extremely likely; Somewhat likely; Neither likely nor unlikely; Somewhat unlikely; Extremely unlikely]

All pre-registered hypotheses were articulated for the forced choice task but not for the ratings scale task. This choice was made for both theoretical and methodological reasons. First, we believe that the forced choice tasks simulates the real-world constraints that require NGOs to be strategic about the grants that they pursue. Asking respondents about the decision that would be made if they could apply for both grants invites respondents to assume that these constraints do not exist. Second, asking respondents to rate each grant profile separately increases the cognitive demands on respondents considerably, potentially increasing the amount of measurement error. Third, the forced choice task imposes the same constraints on the number of grants that each NGO can apply for, setting this number to one grant from each pair. Alternatively, the ratings scale does not impose such a constraint. If some respondents do not consider constraints on their time while others do, this could affect results. This is especially problematic when analyzing subgroup results, where the point of comparison for MMs shifts from 0.5 for all subgroups to the mean grant profile rating for each subgroup. For this reason, values reported in the third panel of subgroup comparison plots now captures the difference in each estimate from the subgroup mean (rather than the difference from 0.5). These differences can be seen in the vertical grey line in the MM plots for each subgroup. For example, advocacy NGOs have an average grant profile rating of 3.1 (sd = 1) while service delivery NGOs have an average grant profile rating of 2.9 (sd=1.2).

Finally, the ratings scale does not prevent respondents from giving the same rating to both grants in a given grant-profile pair. In our sample, 31% of grant profile pairs receive the same rating from the respondent. These responses were spread roughly evenly between service (31%) and advocacy NGOs (26%). Out of 880 pairs of grant profiles, 270 profile pairs were given the same rank by the respondent, with 118 of the 270 pairs ranked as ‘Extremely likely,’ 102 ranked as ‘Somewhat likely,’ 37 ranked as ‘Neither likely nor unlikely,’ 2 ranked as ‘Somewhat unlikely,’ and 11 ranked as ‘Extremely unlikely.’ Out of the 270 profile pairs that were ranked equally by the respondent, 146 had the same value for the harassment attribute. Of the profile-pairs where both profiles received a rating of ‘Extremely likely,’ there was only one pair where both profiles were assigned the ‘Arrest’ attribute value (compared to 6 for ‘Investigate’ and ‘Shut-down’ and 9 for ‘Arrest’ and ‘No information’). In the results below, we drop profile-pairs where both profiles received the same rating.

## Main Results

Results from the ratings task are extremely similar to those presented in Section ???. The only apparent difference is the less pronounced linear effect of Grant Amount on grant profile ratings, perhaps reflecting respondents’ assumption that standard constraints on grant applications do not apply.




Figure 16: Marginal means (left panel) and AMCE estimates (right panel) for the full sample of respondents. For marginal means, points to the left of the grey line indicate that an attribute made respondents less likely to select a grant (on average). For AMCEs, points to the left of the grey line indicate a negative causal effect of the attribute on grant selection relative to the baseline category (on average).

## Subgroup Effects for Advocacy vs Service Delivery

Results from the ratings task show diminished differences between advocacy and service delivery NGOs across all attributes. This diminished difference is driven by much smaller coefficients for advocacy NGOs across nearly all attribute values. This is also true of the effect of harassment, where service NGOs actually appear slightly more sensitive to the highest level of harassment, though this result is not significant. This may be due in part to the higher mean value of grant profile ratings for advocacy NGOs.




Figure 17: Marginal means (top panel) and AMCE estimates (bottom panel) for the effect of government interference across advocacy NGOs (first panel), service delivery NGOs (second panel), and the difference between them (third panel). For marginal means, points to the left of the grey line indicate that an attribute made respondents less likely to select a grant (on average). For AMCEs, points to the left of the grey line indicate a negative causal effect of the attribute on grant selection relative to the baseline category (on average). Our theory expects that the difference between advocacy and service NGOs will be negative, indicating that points in the third panel should be to the left of the grey line.